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SHOULD VIRGINIA PUT THE PLANNING BACK INTO
THE PREMEDITATION REQUIRED FOR MURDER?
Virginia separates murder into capital, first degree, and second
degree murder.1 Murder is a killing committed with the specific intent to
kill with malice.' Malice means the absence of sudden passion in a killer
during a murder.' Capital murder is a willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing that occurs in the commission of certain felonies, or in other
' See VA. CODE §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32 (1982) (types of statutory murder are capital, first
degree, and second degree murder). Capital murder is the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of a person during the commission of an abduction, armed robbery with
deadly weapon, or rape. See VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (1982). Capital murder also includes murder
committed with intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit, murder for hire, murder by a
prisoner in a correctional facility or in the custody of a prison employee, murder of a law-
enforcement officer when the purpose of the killing is to interfere with the performance of
the officer's duties, or murder of more than one person as a part of the same act or transac-
tion. Id. First degree murder is murder, other than capital murder, by poisoning, lying in
wait, imprisoning, starving, or any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or felony
murder. See VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (1982). See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 761, 284
S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981) (felony murder is the statutory offense of murder combined with com-
mission of listed felonies). Second degree murder is murder other than first degree or
capital murder. See id.
2 See Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 667, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982) (murder is
killing committed with malice); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 20, 141 S.E.2d 710, 714
(1965) (murder is homicide committed with malice); Hannah v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 863,
869, 149 S.E. 419, 421 (1929) (deliberate homicide committed with malice is first degree
murder).
- See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811,814 (1981) (malice in-
heres in committing murder intentionally with ill wills towards the victim) (citing Dawkins
v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1947)); Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
466, 473, 10 S.E. 745, 747 (1890) (malice excludes passion in killer); Read v. Commonwealth,
63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 924, 939 (1872) (defendant's use of weapon in cool, deliberate manner in-
dicates presence of malicious purpose and absence of sudden passion). But see Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 829-30, 71 S.E.2d 368, 376 (anger does not preclude premedita-
tion), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 886 (1952). In Bailey, the court stated that a killer armed with a
deadly weapon and waiting for a victim is often angry at the victim. Id., 71 S.E.2d at 376.
The.court reasoned that a killer is guilty of first degree murder if anger caused premedita-
tion because the elements of first degree murder are fulfilled. Id., 71 S.E.2d at 376.
A killing in sudden passion occurs impulsively and without thought on the part of a
killer. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466, 473, 10 S.E. 745, 747 (1890) (act of passion
results from human infirmity, not malignity of heart). An impulsive killing is manslaughter
not murder. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466, 473, 10 S.E. 745, 747 (1890)
(manslaughter is killing committed in heat of passion); Comment, Has the Burger Court
Dealt a Death Blow to the Presumption of Malice in Virginia, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 687, 688
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Death Blow] (manslaughter is killing committed without malice,
or in heat of passion). Although Virginia statutes give a penalty for manslaughter, Virginia
has no statutory definition of manslaughter. See VA. CODE §§ 18.2-35, 18.2-36 (amended 1982)
(voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are Class 5 felony).
Malice is either express malice or implied malice. Mercer v. Commonwealth, 150 Va.
588, 592, 142 S.E. 369, 370 (1928). A murder planned and committed in a cool and deliberate
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certain circumstances.4 First degree murder is either a willful, deliber-
ate, and premeditated killing or felony murder.5 Felony murder is a kill-
ing committed with malice during the commission of certain felonies.'
Second degree murder is a murder other than capital or first degree
murder.7 Premeditation and deliberation are the distinguishing features
between first degree murder and second degree murder.' Premeditation
is also a prerequisite for capital murder.' Therefore, premeditation and
deliberation determine the difference between a five to twenty year
manner constitutes express malice. Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 667, 292 S.E.2d
339, 341 (1982). Implied malice is a purposeful killing without adequate provocation. Id., 292
S.E.2d at 341. The circumstances surrounding a killing and the conduct and statements of a
killer are evidence of malice. See Read v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 924, 938 (1872)
(nature and degree of provocation, reaction of defendant to provocation, character of
weapon used in killing, and conduct of killer, show malice).
Traditionally, the Virginia Supreme Court has presumed malice from the act of killing.
See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 69, 72, 205 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1974) (proof of killing
raises prima facie presumption of malice) (citing Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 681, 686,
111 S.E. 90, 92 (1922)); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 197, 202, 35 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1945)
(Virginia courts generally presume malice from proof of killing). The United States Supreme
Court decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur renders the presumption of malice in Virginia highly
suspect because the presumption operates to force the defendant to disprove malice. See
421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975) (defendant can not be required to disprove an element of the
crime). See Death Blow, supra note 3, at 699-705 (presumption of malice in Virginia un-
constitutional under Mullaney because the burden of disproving malice rests on defendant).
' See supra note 1 (definition of capitalmurder). Felonies are divided into six separate
classes. VA. CODE § 18.2-9 (1982). Capital murder is a Class 1 felony punishable by death or
life imprisonment. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31 (1982).
' See supra note 1 (definition of first degree murder); supra note 4 (explanation of
felony scheme for Virginia homicide law). First degree murder is a Class 2 felony punishable
by imprisonment for twenty years to life. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-32 (1982).
' See VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (1982) (felony murder is one type of first degree murder).
Felony murder is malicious homicide committed during the commission of, or attempt to
commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate object sexual penetration, robbery,
burglary, or abduction. See id.; Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 761, 284 S.E.2d 811,
813 (1981) (definition of felony murder). Felony murder requires malice but not intent to kill
or premeditation. See id. at 762, 284 S.E.2d at 811 (malice necessary for any kind of murder).
See supra note 1 (definition of second degree murder); supra note 4 (explanation of
felony scheme for Virginia homicide law). Second degree murder is a Class 3 felony
punishable by imprisonment for five to twenty years. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-32 (1982).
6 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (proof of premeditation is essential
for first degree murder conviction); Baker v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 193, 195, 237 S.E.2d
88, 89 (1977) (premeditation elevates second degree murder to first degree murder); see also
Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLU1M. L. REv. 701, 704-05
(1937) (first degree murder includes premeditated and deliberate homicide, felony homicide,
and depraved heart murder, while all other murder is second degree murder).
' See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 72, 286 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1982) (capital
murder is willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder occurring during commission of cer-
tain felonies); Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1079, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1980)
(deliberation and premeditation elevates some intentional homicide from second degree
murder to capital murder); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 188, 193, 257 S.E.2d 777, 780
(1979) (felony murder is distinguishable from willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
because premeditated murder does not require evidence essential to a conviction of felony
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prison term for second degree murder and a possible death sentence for
capital murder."0
Intent to kill is a threshold requirement for murder." Without intent
to kill, there usually cannot be murder and premeditation is therefore
irrelevant.'2 Intent to kill can exist independently of premeditation.' 3 A
murderer can decide to kill and act without premeditating on the
killing." An unplanned killing committed with malice and intent to kill is
second degree murder.'5 Virginia courts presume intent to kill and
malice from the act of killing.'6 For second degree murder, the killer
murder). Felony murder differs from capital murder because felony murder does not require
premeditation or intent. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811,
814 (1981) (premeditation and intent to kill are not required for felony murder); Ball v. Com-
monwealth, 221 Va. 754, 757, 273 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1981) (unintentional killing during robbery
is punishable as first degree murder); see also VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (1982) (definition of capital
murder).
" See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982). A defendant robs a
victim's house. The victim surprises the defendant and the defendant shoots and kills the
victim. If the defendant does not premeditate the murder, the defendant will get only five
years in prison for the killing. If he premeditates the killing, the defendant could go to the
electric chair. Id. at 72, 286 S.E.2d at 165.
"I See Baker v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 193, 195, 237 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1977) (malicious in-
tent to kill is element of both first degree murder and second degree murder). Although
malice and intent to kill are not synonymous, malice is evidence of intent to kill. See
Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981) (malice inferred from
intentional killing). The fact that a killer acted without heat of passion can be evidence of in-
tent to kill. See Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 63, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1947) (inten-
tional illegal act implies malice); Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating
Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. Rav. 759, 759 (1949) (intent to kill usually constitutes
malice). Although felony murder and depraved heart murder are malicious acts, they are
not necessarily intentional. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811,
814 (1981) (felony murder conviction does not require proof of intent to kill). Depraved heart
murder is a killing caused by such extreme recklessness that defendant's actions constitute
malice. See Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 20, 141 S.E.2d 701, 714 (1965) (depraved
heart murder is malicious failure to perform a duty, such as a mother's failure to feed a
child).
12 See supra notes 2 & 11 (intent to kill is element of murder).
" See Baker v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 193, 195, 237 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1977) (malicious in-
tent to kill and premeditation are separate elements of first degree murder); King v. Com-
monwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 78, 88 (1817) (time to think about the killing combined with in-
tent to kill constitutes a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder).
" See supra note 8 (premeditation differentiates between first degree murder and se-
cond degree murder).
" See supra notes 1 & 2 (explanation and discussion of second degree, capital and first
degree murder).
" See Pugh v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 663, 667, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982) (every
homicide is presumed to be second degree murder); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va.
391, 398, 4 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1939) (malicious homicide is prima facie evidence of second
degree murder). The United States Supreme Court decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur places
the constitutionality of Virginia's second degree murder presumption in jeopardy. 421 U.S.
684, 702 n.31 (1975)); see also Death Blow, supra note 3, at 700. In Mullaney, a Maine jury
convicted Wilbur of murder. 421 U.S. at 684. Wilbur claimed he lacked malice because the
victim provoked Wilbur's attack by making homosexual advances. Id. at 685. Under Maine
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forms an intent to kill concommitantly with a decision to lsill.17 Intent to
kill can come into existence at any time up to the moment of killing.18
law, murder was criminal homicide committed with malice and manslaughter was criminal
homicide committed without malice. Id. at 691-92. Maine's homicide statutes required that
the defendant produce evidence of provocation or heat of passion to reduce homicide to
manslaughter. Id. The Mullaney Court stated that shifting the burden of proving malice to
the defendant increases the likelihood of erroneous murder convictions. Id. at 701. The
Court noted that malice, or absence of malice, is a statutory element of murder in Maine. Id.
at 697-98. The Court also stated that the burden of proving every element of the crime rests
on the prosecution. Id. at 702 n.31. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The
Mullaney court held, therefore, that the prosecution must prove malice or the absence of
malice. 421 U.S. at 704.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. New York, however,
upheld presumptions of elements not clearly contained in statutory law. See 432 U.S. 197,
215-16 (1977). In Patterson, the trial court convicted the defendant of killing his estranged
wife's lover. Id. at 200. The defense argued on appeal that the state had to prove that Pat-
terson did not suffer from extreme emotional disturbance. Id- at 201. The Patterson Court
held that emotional disturbance is not an element of murder but a separate issue that the
defendant must prove as an affirmative defense. Id. at 206-07.
With Virginia's second degree murder presumption, a trial court will convict a defen-
dant of murder unless the defendant produces evidence showing provocation or mitigating
circumstances. See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338, 342, 228 S.E.2d 692, 695-96 (1976)
(burden of production of evidence on defendant but burden of persuasion remains on the
prosecution). The Hodge Court held that the burden of persuasion, however, always re-
mains on the prosecution. Id. at 342, 228 S.E.2d at 697. The defendant must produce some
evidence of an affirmative defense before the prosecution has the burden of the defense. Id.
at 341, 228 S.E.2d at 695. The second degree murder presumption places the burden of in-
troducing evidence of affirmative defenses on the defendant. Id., 228 S.E.2d at 695. The pro-
secution might not have to prove the elements of murder because the elements are inferred
from the act of killing. Death Blow, supra note 3, at 700.
Several Virginia Supreme Court decisions have upheld Virginia's second degree
murder presumption despite Mullaney. The court in Hodge v. Commonwealth found that
the second degree murder presumption does not conclusively establish murder and that a
defendant need only produce some credible evidence showing murder in the heat of passion
to overcome the presumption. 217 Va. 338, 342, 228 S.E.2d 692, 695-96 (1976). The Hodge
court concluded that no presumption can relieve the prosecution of the burden of showing
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 343, 228 S.E.2d at 695. In McGhee v.
Commonwealth, the court interpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pat-
terson to hold that the prosecution does not have the burden of disproving all affirmative
defenses. See 219 Va. 560, 564-65, 248 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1978). The McGhee court held that a
trial court may still require a defendant to negate intent to kill by showing evidence of an
accidental killing. Id. at 564, 248 S.E.2d at 811; see Daughtery v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
353, 353, 228 S.E.2d 701, 701 (1976) (second degree murder presumption does not switch pro-
secution's burden of showing guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt). Virginia courts
require that jury instructions clearly explain that the second degree murder presumption
does not change the burden of persuasion. See Warlitner v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 348,
350, 228 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1976) (effect of presumption on jury determined by considering in-
structions taken as a whole), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 957 (1977); see also Hodge v. Com-
monwealth, 217 Va. 338, 347, 228 S.E.2d 692, 698 (1976) (court must read jury instructions as
a whole to determine effect of one instruction on jury).
1 See supra note 11 (definition of intent to kill).
," See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (killer may form intent to kill at
moment of killing); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 429, 432, 230 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1976)
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For first degree murder, a killer deliberates or plans the homicide
before making the ultimate decision to kill.19 Premeditation without the
act of killing does not result in a criminally culpable act." Although
premeditation requires no specific amount of time,21 a long period of time
increases the likelihood that even a slow thinker had time to plan a kill-
ing.' The planning necessary for first degree murder, however, can oc-
cur in a matter of seconds.'
Intent to kill and premeditation are states of mind. 4 The fact finder
determines whether a defendant intended to kill and whether a defen-
(intent to kill need not exist for any particular length of time prior to killing); Akers v. Com-
monwealth, 216 Va. 40, 48, 216 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1975) (killer may form intent to kill at time of
killing); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 391, 398-400, 4 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1939) (jury
instruction that intent to kill only need exist at time of killing permitted); McDaniel v. Com-
monwealth, 77 Va. 281, 284 (1883) (killer may form intent to kill at moment of killing).
'" See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1074, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1980)
(premeditation exists if defendant had time to think of killing and intended to kill) (citing
Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 391, 399, 4 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1939)); King v. Common-
wealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 78, 88 (1817) (premeditated murder requires time to think about
killing and intent to kill). Virginia courts have presumed premeditation and prima facie first
degree murder when the accused killed with a deadly weapon previously possessed by the
accused. See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 829-30, 71 S.E.2d 368, 375-76 (presump-
tion of first degree murder arises when deadly weapon was in previous possession of killer),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 886 (1952); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 131, 138, 41 S.E.2d 476,
479 (1947) (presumption of first degree murder with deadly weapon in previous possession of
killer forces defendant to prove extenuating circumstances); Clinton v. Commonwealth, 161
Va. 1084, 1089, 172 S.E. 272, 273-74 (1934) (killing with deadly weapon in previous possession
of killer shows prima facie guilt of premeditated murder); Scott v. Commonwealth, 143 Va.
510, 523-24, 129 S.E. 360, 363 (1925) (first degree murder presumed when deadly weapon in
previous possession of killer). Presumption of first degree murder is no longer valid after
Baker v. Muncy. 619 F.2d 327, 332 (1980). In Baker, the court rejected the presumption of
prima facie first degree murder because of the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v.
Wilbur. 619 F.2d at 332. See supra note 16 (discussion of Mullaney). Although the first
degree murder presumption only required that the accused show extenuating cir-
cumstances to rebut the presumption, the Baker court held that there was a substantial risk
that the jury would interpret the presumption as providing proof of premeditation beyond a
reasonable doubt. 619 F.2d at 332.
1 See supra text accompanying note 2 (definition of murder). Planning a killing is not a
crime without an actual attempt to kill. See Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238
S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977) (attempted murder requires intent to kill and overt act towards actual
killing).
21 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (premeditation does not require an
appreciable amount of time).
I See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 71, 286 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1982) (time be-
tween forming intent to kill and killing is relevant to show that defendant had the ability to
premeditate); Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1074, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1980) (in-
tent to kill must exist for sufficient period of time to permit premeditation).
See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1074, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1980)
(premeditation demands only a matter of seconds).
"L See Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977) (intent to
kill is decision to kill made in person's mind); Howard v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 222, 228,
148 S.E.2d 800, 804 (1966) (intent to kill is state of mind).
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dant premeditated the killing.25 The fact finder determines intent to kill
and premeditation by drawing inferences from circumstances surround-
ing the killing, the conduct of the defendant, and statements made by
the defendant before and after the homicide. 6 Although premeditation
and intent to kill are difficult concepts to define,' the concepts are
crucial to a determination of the culpability of a killer.28 The fact finder,
therefore, should receive clear direction on the meaning of premedita-
tion and intent to kill.'
William Penn originated the concept of premeditation to describe
the planning element in the worst homicides."' Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Justice William Bradford stated that the death penalty should ex-
ist only for deliberate, premeditated assassinations." A 1794 Penn-
sylvania Senate statute required premeditation and deliberation for
I See Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 365, 171 S.E.2d 166, 170 (1969) (jury
must decide whether there is sufficient evidence of a crime to prove murder beyond
reasonable doubt) (citing Bryan v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 709, 714, 109 S.E.477, 478 (1921));
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 516, 62 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1950) (jury determines degree of
murder from evidence of crime); Wright v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 880, 892-93
(1880) (same).
See Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979) (intent to
kill proven by circumstantial evidence) (citing Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 460, 461,
184 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1971)); Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810
(1977) (intent to kill shown by circumstances surrounding the killing and defendant's con-
duct and statements).
I See Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Law, reprinted in LAW AND LITERATURE
70, 99-100 (1931) (courts should change vague distinction between premeditation and intent
to kill).
I See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 12 (explanation and discussion of impor-
tance of intent to kill and premeditation).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (juries must be guided carefully and ade-
quately); Cardozo, supra note 27, at 99-100.
30 See Keedy, supra note 11, at 772 (William Penn intended premeditation to mean
thought and planning on the killing before committing the act). The intent of a killer has
long determined the moral blameworthiness and punishment of a killer. See Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 981 (1932) (intent of defendant has always been crucial factor for
determining punishment). English courts distinguished a killing with malice from other kill-
ings as early as the 12th century. See Green, The Jury and the English law of Homicide
1200-1600, 74 U. MICH. L. REv. 414, 419 (1975) (English courts defined a slaying with malice
as felonious homicide in 12th century). Originally, malice in the English legal system simply
denoted a desire to kill. Id By the early 1500s, the punishment for planned murder commit-
ted with "malice prepensed," the old English equivalent of premeditated murder, was
death. See Green, supra, at 476; Keedy, supra note 11, at 759.
In 1682 and 1683, the Pennsylvania legislature under William Penn's guidance,
modified the English homicide law existing in America and restricted the death penalty to
willful or .premeditated murder. See Keedy, supra note 11, at 771.
S" See W. Bradford, An Enquiry How Far The Punishment Of Death Is.Necessary In
Pennsylvania, reprinted in REFORM ON CRIMINAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA 35-37 (1971)




capital murder.2 Pennsylvania allowed the death penalty only for a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.13 Virginia enacted Penn-
sylvania's statutory murder scheme, including the concepts of premedita-
tion and deliberation, in 1796.1'
Beginning with King v. Commonwealth,31 the Virginia Supreme
Court enforced Virginia's statutory distinction between premeditation
and intent to kill.3 ' In King, a jury convicted King of second degree
murder for stabbing a man to death during an argument over a card
game.37 A jury sentenced King to eighteen years in prison for the
murder.' King appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court because the kill-
ing occurred during a fight and, therefore, only could be manslaughter. 9
The court held that a killing committed during a fight is an act of self
defense or an act in the heat of passion, and usually is not a malicious
homicide." The King court dismissed King's appeal, however, because
the court presumed the malice necessary for murder from King's use of a
deadly weapon after only slight provocation.43 The court explained that
first degree murder is a killing done on purpose after premeditation,
while manslaughter is an accidental killing occuring under cir-
cumstances suggesting that the killer acted in the heat of passion.42 The
court explained that first degree murder requires a killer to develop a
-" See Keedy, supra note 11, at 773. A 1794 Pennsylvania Senate resolution classified
first degree murder as murder by poison, murder by lying in wait, or willful, premeditated,
and deliberate killing. Id.
See Note, Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97, 101 (1972) (only first
degree murder remained a capital offense under the Pennsylvania murder statute adopted
by Virginia). A murder must fulfill all the requirements of an intentional, deliberate, and
premeditated killing to be punishable by death. See Michael & Wechsler, supra note 8, at
704 (homicide must be willful, premeditated, and deliberate to be first degree murder).
I See King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 78, 84 (1817) (Virginia's homicide laws
borrowed from Pennsylvania); Capital Punishment supra note 33, at 102 (Virginia adopted
the same harsh degrees of murder as Pennsylvania in 1796).
4 Va. 78 (1817).
See McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281, 284 (1883) (premeditation differs from
intent to kill because a premeditated killing requires time for reflection on the killing); King
v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 78, 86 (1817) (time to think about killing is necessary for
premeditation but not for intent to kill); see also Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20
Gratt.) 860, 871 (1871) (involuntary intoxication negates premeditation but not intent to kill).
See King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 78,78 (1817). In King, King and the victim argued
over a bottle of whiskey. Id. King stabbed the victim in the stomach and fled. Id at 79. A
witness stated that King sharpened his knife prior to the killing and spoke of getting
revenge on someone. Id. at 80.
3 Id. at 78.
Id- at 83; see supra note 3 (description of manslaughter).
4 Va. at 84 (killing during fight is manslaughter unless one party takes undue advan-
tage or inflicts fatal blow at the beginning of fight).
'1 Id. at 83 (malice presumed from fact that first blow fatally wounded opponent).
" Id- at 85 (fact that first blow was fatal is evidence of an intent to kill).
19831
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Plan about a killing before actually committing the homicide. 43 The King
court stated that first degree murder occurs if a killer has time to think
about a killing, and intends to kill for even a short time before acting."
The court differentiated between the time necessary to plan a murder
and the time necessary to form an intent to kill.45 The court said that
premeditation requires more than deliberation and deliberation requires
more than intent to kill. 4' Although the King court provided no guidance
on the length of time required for a killer to think about a murder before
forming an intent to kill,47 the court in McDaniel v. Commonwealth8
separated the time elements of intent to kill and premeditation. 49
In McDaniel, the trial court convicted McDaniel of first degree
murder and sentenced McDaniel to death for striking and killing his vic-
tim with a stick.," McDaniel claimed that he acted only because of the vic-
tim's threats." On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, however, the
court found that although McDaniel intended to kill the victim, the jury
incorrectly convicted McDaniel of first degree murder.2 The court,
therefore, reversed McDaniel's first degree murder conviction. 3 The
court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that McDaniel
thought about whether to kill and acted according to a preconceived plan
about the killing. 4 The McDaniel court contrasted the time element of
intent to kill with the time element of premeditation.5 The court held
that premeditation requires at least some time for reflection, while in-
tent to kill can exist only at the moment of the killing. 6
41 Id at 86 (time to think provides a killer with time to think whether to kill).
4I M at 88.
SId. (premeditation requires more than deliberation and deliberation requires more
than intent to kill).
4 Id
' Id (no time element for deliberation can be fixed by law).
77 Va. 281 (1883).
" See infra text accompanying notes 55 and 56 (discussion of McDaniel court's distinc-
tion between intent to kill and premeditation).
I See McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281, 285 (1883). In McDaniel, McDaniel bor-
rowed the victim's horse. Id at 284. When McDaniel returned the horse the victim accused
McDaniel of mistreating the horse. Id. at 285. Since both men were intoxicated, both men
became angry and a quarrel started. Id at 284. Shortly after the quarrel, the victim came up
to McDaniel with a stick and the defendant struck the victim. Id at 285. The victim raised
his stick in protection and then struck at McDaniel. Id McDaniel struck back, killing the vic-
tim with his second blow. Id
51 Id. at 282.
52 I& at 286.
Id at 288.
Id. at 287. The McDaniel court held that the defendant's statements and the blows
to the victim do not warrant a finding of first degree murder without further evidence of
premeditation. Id. at 286.
Id. at 284.
" Id The McDaniel court held that a premeditated murderer thinks about the killing
before determining to kill. Id.
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Virginia Supreme Court decisions after McDaniel ignored the
distinction between the time elements required for premeditation and in-
tent to kill made by the McDaniel court.57 In Mosby v. Commonwealth,"
Mosby shot and killed the victim during an argument over Mosby's inten-
tions towards the victim's wife. 9 A jury found that the victim did not pro-
voke Mosby and that Mosby killed with premeditation and malice. The
jury convicted Mosby of first degree murder." On Mosby's appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court, the court affirmed the first degree murder con-
viction.2 The court held that the will to kill and purpose of killing, not the
interval of time between formation of the will to kill and the act, deter-
mines the degree of murder."3 The Mosby court, therefore, equated inten-
tional murder with premeditated murder."
After Mosby, the Virginia Supreme Court followed the reasoning in
Mosby that the will to kill and purpose of killing, not the time interval be-
tween formation of intent to kill and the killing, determines the level of
culpability. 5 In Bailey v. Commonwealth,"6 Bailey stabbed a car garage
manager after a dispute over a bill for car repairs. 7 The jury convicted
Bailey of first degree murder and sentenced Bailey to life imprisonment."
"T See Fuller v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 724, 730, 113 S.E.2d 667, 672 (1960) (will and
purpose to kill, not interval of time, determines degree of murder); Bailey v. Com-
monwealth, 191 Va. 510, 516, 62 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1950) (same); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185
Va. 244, 255, 38 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1946) (difference between the first degree murder and se-
cond degree murder depends on intent of killer at time of killing); Mosby v. Commonwealth,
168 Va. 688, 694, 190 S.E. 152, 154 (1937) (intent to kill determines degree of culpability);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 128 Va. 698, 715-16, 104 S.E. 853, 859 (1920) (proof of intent to
kill elevates murder to first degree murder). But see Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va.
391, 399, 4 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1939) (premeditated killing requires both time to think of killing
and intent to kill).
168 Va. 688, 190 S.E. 152 (1937).
" Id. at 691, 190 S.E. at 153. In Mosby, the victim and Mosby started arguing at a par-
ty. Id., 190 S.E. at 153. The victim threatened Mosby and called Mosby a name. Id. at 691,
190 S.E. at 153. Mosby left the party. Id., 190 S.E. at 153. Upon re-entering the room, Mosby
shot the victim from behind the door. Id., 190 S.E. at 153.
Id. at 695, 190 S.E. at 155.
Id. at 691, 190 S.E. at 153.
6 Id. at 695, 190 S.E. at 155.
Id. at 694, 190 S.E. at 154.
Id., 190 S.E. at 154.
See Hairston v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 429, 432, 230 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1976) (will and
purpose to kill, not interval of time, determines the degree of murder); accord, Akers v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 48, 216 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1975); Fuller v. Commonwealth, 201 Va.
724, 730, 113 S.E.2d 667, 672 (1960); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 516, 62 S.E.2d 28,
31 (1950); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 255, 38 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1946).
" 191 Va. 510, 62 S.E.2d 28 (1950).
6 Id. at 516-17, 62 S.E.2d at 29-30. In Bailey, Bailey drank alcohol before going to pick
up his car at the victim's garage. Id. at 516, 62 S.E.2d at 29. Bailey refused to pay the bill for
car repairs or to leave the garage. Id. at 514-15, 62 S.E.2d at 29-30. The victim and Bailey
started to fight and Bailey stabbed the victim in the chest. Id., 62 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 514, 62 S.E.2d at 29.
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On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Bailey contended that a first
degree murder conviction was improper because the period of time
necessary for premeditation had not elapsed. 9 The court concurred with
the jury's finding that Bailey committed a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder without adequate provocation.° The court re-
versed the first degree murder conviction, however, because the jury
selection was discriminatory." The Bailey court ignored the distinction
between premeditation and intent to kill. 2
Twenty-five years afterBailey, the Virginia Supreme Court inAkers v.
Commonwealth 3 continued to equate an intentional murder with a
premeditated murder. 4 In Akers, Akers confessed to killing a fourteen
year old girl to stop the girl's screams." Akers met the victim at a local con-
venience store and forced the girl to come to his apartment. The prosecu-
tion presented evidence showing either felony murder or premeditated
murder.7 The trial judge convicted Akers of first degree murder and
sentenced Akers to life imprisonment. 8 On appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court, Akers contended that the trial judge erred in not requiring the pro-
secution to charge the defendant with only one theory of first degree
murder. 9 Akers claimed that felony murder and premeditated murder are
mutually exclusive theories of first degree murder." The Akers court af-
firmed Aker's first degree murder conviction because sufficient evidence
existed to convict Akers of both premeditated murder and felony murder. 1
The court found that the evidence showed that Akers killed during an ab-
duction for immoral purposes, committing a felony murder, and also a first
degree murder by intentionally killing the victim with premeditation."
69 Id at 516, 62 S.E.2d at 29.
7o Id. at 517-18, 62 S.E.2d at 30-31.
71 Id. at 523-24, 62 S.E.2d at 34 (evidence sufficient to reverse conviction because jury
was not selected without regard to race).
72 See supra note 65 (examples of earlier courts that failed to distinguish between
premeditation and intent to kill).
" 216 Va. 40, 216 S.E.2d 28 (1975).
74 See supra note 65 (examples of earlier courts that failed to distinguish between
premeditation and intent to kill).
7' 216 Va. at 48, 216 S.E.2d at 33.
7' Id at 42, 216 S.E.2d at 30. In Akers, Akers threatened the victim with a knife to get
the victim to go to Akers' apartment. Id., 216 S.E.2d at 30. When Akers started unbuckling
the victim's pants in the bedroom, the victim screamed. Id. at 42, 216 S.E.2d at 29. Although
Akers did not rape the victim, he stabbed the victim in the chest seven times. Id., 216
S.E.2d at 30. Akers called the police to confess the killing. Id., 216 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 47-48, 216 S.E.2d at 33.
Id. at 41, 216 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 47, 216 S.E.2d at 33. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Akers con-
tested the voluntariness of his confession. Id. at 45, 216 S.E.2d at 31. The Akers court held
that the defendant's confession was voluntary because the police officers conducting the in-
terrogation protected Akers' rights. Id. at 46, 216 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 48, 216 S.E.2d at 32-33.
Id., 216 S.E.2d at 33.
Id, 216 S.E.2d at 33.
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The court held that the formation of an intent to kill results in a willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder." The court determined that Akers
formed the intent to kill when the victim began screaming for help. 4 The
court, therefore, concluded that Akers committed a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder.
8 5
Similar to the court in Akers, the Virginia Supreme Court in Hairston
v. Commonwealth" upheld Hairston's conviction for premeditated murder
because the defendant intended to kill the victim. 7 In Hairston, Hairston
obtained a ride from the victim and later shot the victim in the head.88 The
trial judge convicted Hairston of first degree murder and sentenced
Hairston to life imprisonment. 9 Hairston claimed that there was not the
evidence of premeditation and deliberation necessary for a first degree
murder conviction.9" The Hairston court inferred an intent to kill from the
fact that the victim died trying to escape and that Hairston later attempted
to cover up the murder' The court, therefore, concluded that the trial
judge was justified in finding willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder.9"
One year after Hairston, the Virginia Supreme Court in Baker v.
Commonwealth93 again distinguished between intentional killing and
premeditated killing. 4 In Baker, Baker killed two men in an argument
over a dice game.9" The jury convicted Baker of first degree murder and
involuntary manslaughter." On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,
Baker challenged the prosecution's jury instruction that described the
elements of premeditated murder. 7 The instruction described the
amount of time necessary for intent to kill without reference to the time
- Id., 216 S.E.2d at 33 (intent to kill originating with act of killing suffices to prove
premeditated killing).
" Id, 216 S.E.2d at 33 (court provided no reasons for deciding that Akers formed the
intent to kill when the victim began screaming).
Id, 216 S.E.2d at 33.
217 Va. 429, 230 S.E.2d 626 (1976).
Id at 432, 230 S.E.2d at 628.
u Id. at 430, 230 S.E.2d at 627.
, Id at 429, 230 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 430, 230 S.E.2d at 627.
" Id. at 432, 230 S.E.2d at 628. In Hairston, the victim's body fell out of the car after
the shooting because the victim had opened the door in an attempt to escape. Id-, 230 S.E.2d
at 628. The defendant obtained help from a friend in burning the victim's body and car to
cover up the killing. Id, 230 S.E.2d at 628.
Id. at 432, 230 S.E.2d at 628.
'3 218 Va. 193, 237 S.E.2d 88 (1977).
" See 218 Va. at 195, 237 S.E.2d at 89 (intent is element of both first degree murder
and second degree murder but premeditation elevates second degree murder to first degree
murder). See supra note 11 (explanation of intent to kill).
218 Va. at 194, 237 S.E.2d at 88.
" Id (Baker killed one victim before killing second victim in scuffle over gun used to
kill first victim).
" Id at 194, 237 S.E.2d at 88-89.
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necessary for premeditation. 8 Baker argued that the instruction misled
the jury into equating the time element for intent to kill with the time
element for premeditation.9 Baker contended that the jury incorrectly
believed that premeditation originating contemporaneously with the act
of killing suffices to support a first degree murder conviction." The
Baker court recognized the difference between premeditation and intent
to kill and agreed with Baker's contention that premeditation origi-
nating at the time of a killing is insufficient to support a first degree
murder conviction. 1 The court explained that although intent to kill is
an element of both first and second degree murder, proof of premedita-
tion elevates second degree murder to first degree murder. 2 The Baker
court found that although the jury instruction referred to a willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder, the purpose of the instruction was
to define the time element for intent to kill.0 3 The court required omis-
sion of any reference to premeditation in an instruction on intent to kill
in the future."4 The court, however, affirmed Baker's conviction because
the court concluded that the trial court adequately preserved the
distinction between premeditation and intent to kill by giving a separate
instruction on premeditation. 00
Some Virginia Supreme Court cases, however, have not followed the
Baker court's reasoning and have not preserved adequately the distinc-
tion between premeditation and intent to kill.'06 In Smith v. Corn-
'8 Id. at 195, 237 S.E.2d at 89.
" Id., 237 S.E.2d at 89.
10 Id., 237 S.E.2d at 89.
1o Id., 237 S.E.2d at 89.
Id, 237 S.E.2d at 89.
Id., 237 S.E.2d at 89.
10 Id., 237 S.E.2d at 89.
1Id, 237 S.E.2d at 89.
1 See Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 VRR 187, 202, - S.E.2d -, (1982) (first
degree murder requires intentional killing); Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 703, 261
S.E.2d 550, 553 (1980) (premeditation is adoption of intent to kill); Harrison v. Com-
monwealth, 220 Va. 188, 194, 257 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1979) (premeditation requires intent to kill
and act of killing).
In Harrison v. Commonwealth, Harrison and a companion killed a service station
manager while committing an armed robbery. 220 Va. at 194, 257 S.E.2d at 778. The trial
court found Harrison guilty of murder in the commission of a robbery at least as a principal
of the second degree. Id at 190, 257 S.E.2d at 778. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court
stated that premeditated murder requires intent to kill and proof of a killing. Id.,at 194, 257
S.E.2d at 781. The Harrison court affirmed, classifying Harrison's conviction as a first
degree murder and armed robbery. Id The court primarily considered whether double
jeopardy barred conviction of first degree murder when a defendant had been convicted
already of a related armed robbery. Id. at 191, 257 S.E.2d at 780. The court held that willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder, unlike felony murder, does not require evidence of
the felony in a separate charge. Id at 193, 257 S.E.2d at 780-81. The court held that double
jeopardy does not bar convictions of premeditated murder and of a separate felony occurr-
ing at the same time as the murder. Id. at 194, 257 S.E.2d at 780.
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monwealth, 7 police found the victim's body four weeks after the
victim's disappearance." 8 Witnesses testified that the victim was with
Smith shortly before disappearing."°9 The trial court convicted Smith of
first degree murder and sentenced Smith to twenty-five years in prison.'
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Smith challenged the suffi-
ciency of evidence on premeditation."' The Smith court defined
premeditation as specific intent to kill."' The court accepted the reason-
ing of the Akers court that the will to kill and purpose for killing, not the
interval of time, determines the degree of murder."' The court classified
Smith's actions before and after the killing as totally inconsistent with
those in an accidental or unintentional killing."' The Smith court con-
cluded, therefore, that the evidence showed that Smith committed a
deliberate, intentional, and premeditated killing."1
The Smith dissent objected to the majority's holding that intent to
kill alone can suffice to prove first degree murder."' Although the dissent
agreed with the majority that Smith had the intent to commit murder,the
dissent found no evidence of premeditation."7 The dissent stated that
premeditation and intent to kill are distinct elements of first degree
murder."8 The dissent described premeditation as a process of con-
templation requiring much more than the adoption of an intent to kill."'
" 220 Va. 696, 261 S.E.2d 550 (1980).
" Id. at 700, 261 S.E.2d at 552. In Smith, the defendant claimed that another man kill-
ed the victim. Id at 700, 261 S.E.2d at 552-53. Circumstantial evidence linked the defendant
to the victim's disappearance. Id at 698-700, 261 S.E.2d at 553-54. Witnesses testified that
the defendant's car was seen in the same deserted area as the victim's body around the time
of murder. Id at 698-99, 261 S.E.2d at 551-52. Police recovered the victim's car in the posses-
sion of the defendant. Id., 261 S.E.2d at 552. Other evidence showed that the defendant held
his four year old son hostage in an attempt to resist arrest and that the defendant admitted
to a cellmate that he might have killed the victim. Id. at 700, 261 S.E.2d at 553. The jury
determined that the evidence of intent to kill and premeditation was sufficient to convict
the defendant of first degree murder. Id. at 697, 261 S.E.2d at 555.
It Id. at 698-99, 261 S.E.2d at 551-52.
Id. at 697, 261 S.E.2d at 551.
"' Id. at 702, 261 S.E.2d at 553.
" Id-, 261 S.E.2d at 553.
"' Id., 261 S.E.2d at 553. See Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 48, 216 S.E.2d 28, 33
(1975) (will and purpose to kill, not interval of time, determines the degree of murder).
... Id at 702-03, 261 S.E.2d at 554.
Id at 703, 261 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. at 704, 261 S.E.2d at 555 (Poff, J., dissenting) (majority equates premeditation
and intent to kill).
"Id., 261 S.E.2d at 555 (majority based conclusion of first degree murder on in-
ferences that are insufficient to support a finding of premeditation beyond a reasonable
doubt).
. Id-, 261 S.E.2d at 555 (majority's statement that premeditation is the formation of an
intent to kill is misleading).
.. Id, 261 S.E.2d at 555 (premeditation is evidence of willful persistence in a continuing
criminal design).
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The dissent stated that the Virginia legislature intentionally chose
premeditation as an element of the worst homicide.12 ° The dissent found,
therefore, that the majority opinion thwarts legislative intent by not
distinguishing between premeditation and intent to kill.121 The dissent
determined, in addition, that the majority opinion conflicts with previous
Virginia Supreme Court decisions that separate premeditation from in-
tent to kill.122
The Virginia Supreme Court adopted the Smith dissent's separation
of intent to kill and premeditation in Giarratano v. Commonwealth."2 In
Giarratano, Giarratano confessed to raping and strangling a teenage
girl. 24 Giarratano also confessed to killing the girl's mother to cover up
the rape and murder of the daughter.121 The trial judge conviced Giar-
ratano of rape, first degree murder, and capital murder.'28 On appeal to
the Virginia Supreme Court, the defense argued that Giarratano lacked
the mental capacity to premeditate because of insanity and intoxication,
and also that the absence of time for Giarratano to develop a murder
plan precluded a finding of premeditation." The court found that Giar-
ratano was able to premeditate at the time of the murder.28 The court
10 Id., 261 S.E.2d at 555.
1R1 Id., 261 S.E.2d at 555.
'= Id., 261 S.E.2d at 555. The Smith dissent gave as examples cases where the defen-
dant pleads intoxication as a defense to first degree murder. Id., 261 S.E.2d at 555. Griggs v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 46, 52, 255 S.E.2d 475, 479 (1979) (voluntary intoxication negates
premeditation and deliberation); Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 814, 241 S.E.2d
756, 758 (1978) (drunkenness renders defendant incapable of premeditation); Chittum v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 18, 174 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1970) (intoxication negates premedita-
tion but not other elements of the crime); see also Gills v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 445, 450,
126 S.E. 51, 53 (1925) (drunkenness if irrelevant in determining second degree murder or
manslaughter); Brenan v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 846, 850, 33 S.E.2d 639, 640 (1945) (intox-
ication does not negate intent to commit robbery).
12 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
12 Id. at 1073-74, 266 S.E.2d at 97. In Giarratano, Giarratano went into the victims'
apartment. Id. at 1073, 266 S.E.2d at 96. Under the influence of drugs, Giarratano responded
to the first victim's supposed advances and raped the girl. Id at 1066, 266 S.E.2d at 97. The
girl refused to stop screaming, and the defendant strangled her. Id., 266 S.E.2d at 97. After
the defendant left the apartment, he then returned to turn off the lights. Id., 266 S.E.2d at
97. Giarratano proceeded to wait for the girl's mother to prevent the mother from talking
about the murder. Id., 266 S.E. at 97. When the mother returned home, the defendant stab-
bed the mother three times as she fought the defendant. Id., 266 S.E.2d at 97.
2 Id. at 1073-74, 266 S.E.2d at 97.
12 Id. at 1066, 266 S.E.2d at 95.
12 Id. at 1073, 266 S.E.2d at 99.
1 Id. at 1079, 266 S.E.2d at 103. In Giarratano, the doctor who examined Giarratano to
determine his mental condition testified that Giarratano was mentally competent to stand
trial and, at the time of the murders, was not mentally ill. Id at 1070, 266 S.E.2d at 97. The
doctor also testified that the drugs taken by the defendant could not cause the degree of in-
sanity necessary to prevent the defendant from knowing right or wrong. Id. at 1071, 266
S.E.2d at 98. The Giarratano court found that the defendant's conduct immediately before
and after the murders refuted the defendant's claim of mental incapacity. Id., 266 S.E.2d at
[Vol. 40:341
PREMEDITATION IN VIRGINIA
determined that a killer need only premeditate and plan the killing for a
matter of seconds to satisfy the requirement of premeditation for first
degree murder." The court held that ample time elapsed, during which
Giarratano told the screaming girl to be quiet, for Giarratano to
deliberate and meditate on the intent to kill.3" Although the court held
that premeditation could occur in a matter of seconds, the Giarratano
court considered premeditation and intent to kill as distinct elements."'1
The court in Whitley v. Commonwealth.3 recognized the difference
between premeditation and intent to kill reestablished by the Giar-
ratano court." In Whitley, Whitley confessed to killing an elderly widow
and taking the victim's car and credit cards." The trial court convicted
Whitley of capital murder.3 ' On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,
Whitley argued that the prosecution did not prove premeditation beyond a
reasonable doubt. 8' The court found that although the time between the
formation of an intent to kill and a killing does not control a finding on
premeditation, the amount of time between formation of intent to kill and
killing does show that defendant had sufficient time to premeditate the
killing.3 The court stated that intent to kill is the result of the process of
premeditation." The Whitley court affirmed Whitley's conviction for
capital murder and upheld imposition of the death penalty.139 The Whitley
court's holding that intent to kill is the result of premeditation differs
from previous Virginia Supreme Court reasoning equating intent to kill
with premeditation. 4 '
The recent Virginia Supreme Court decision in Epperly v. Com-
monwealth... did not follow the reasoning in Whitley distinguishing
premeditation and intent to kill.' The Epperly court returned to the
' Id at 1074, 266 S.E.2d at 100.
Id., 266 S.E.2d at 100 (court inferred sufficient time to premeditate from
Giarratano's strangling the victim after telling her to be quiet).
1 Id, 266 S.E.2d at 100.
' 223 Va. 66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982).
" Id. at 72, 286 S.E.2d at 164-65 (intent to kill is product of premeditation); see supra
text accompanying note 131 (Giarratano court's distinction between intent to kill and
premeditation).
13 Id, 286 S.E.2d at 165. In Whitley, Whitley went to the victim's home to use the
telephone before the killing. Id. at 71, 286 S.E.2d at 165. The police found the victim's body
with hands tied, throat cut, and umbrellas inserted in the vaginal and rectal cavities. Id., 286
S.E.2d at 164-65.
' Id, 286 S.E.2d at 164.
' Id-, at 72, 286 S.E.2d at 165.
13 Id., 286 S.E.2d at 165.
' Id., at 286 S.E.2d at 165.
' Id. at 82, 286 S.E.2d at 171.
o See supra notes 57 & 65 (examples of Virginia cases equating premeditation and in-
tent to kill by using intent to kill to separate first degree and second degree murder).
" 224 VRR 187, - S.E.2d - (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 147-49 (explanation of reasoning of Epperly
court); see also Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 72, 286 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1982) (intent
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reasoning enunciated in Mosby that intent to kill distinguishes first
degree and second degree murder.' In Epperly, a jury convicted Epper-
ly of first degree murder for killing a college coed and sentenced Epperly
to life imprisonment.'44 Although the victim's body was never found,
strong circumstantial evidence linked Epperly with the missing coed at
the time of the coed's disappearance.4  On appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court, Epperly argued that the evidence did not support a fin-
ding of premeditation and deliberation because the prosecution did not
show an intent to kill necessary for first degree murder.'46 The Epperly
court affirmed Epperly's conviction because the jury justifiably inferred
intent to kill and premeditation from the evidence. 147 The evidence show-
ed the brutality of the attack, the disparity in size and strength between
to kill is not the same as premeditation). See supra text accompanying notes 134-39 (ex-
planation of Whitley).
"' 224 VRR at 203, - S.E.2d at -; see supra text accompanying note 64 (Mosby
court reasoned that intent to kill determines level of culpability).
.. 224 VRR at 187, - S.E.2d at _ .
145 Id. at 199, - S.E.2d at - (prosecution can use circumstantial evidence to prove
victim's death and that criminal violence caused the victim's death).
A person's disappearance without other evidence is legally insufficient to prove either
a person's death or a defendant's actions in causing a person's death, the two elements of
corpus delicti in a homicide. See Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92 (1907) (disap-
pearance of victim is only one circumstance tending to show death); Perkins, The Corpus
Delicti of Murder, 48 VA. L. REV. 173, 185 (1962) (proof of disappearance alone does not
establish corpus delicti). The prosecution must prove corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict a defendant of homicide. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154
(1954). Although a rare occurrence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove corpus
delicit if the evidence produces a moral certainty of the victim's death in the minds of the
jurors. See Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 435, 61 S.E.2d 267, 271 (1950) (cir-
cumstances must produce moral certainty of the defendant's guilt); Smith v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 800, 816, 40 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1946) (prosecution must prove by circumstantial
or direct evidence that defendant caused death of victim). The evidence used to prove cor-
pus delicti where the victim's body is missing includes direct evidence of violence linking
defendant with the victim's disappearance, production of a small part of the victim's body,
or incriminating evidence where the defendant confessed to the crime or admitted the vic-
tim's death. See Pero.vich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1907) (burned parts of victim's
body introduced as evidence); Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 436-37, 61 S.E.2d 267,
273 (1950) (blood on defendant, and defendant's razor blade, and motive of defendant, suffice
to prove corpus delicti); Smith v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 800, 817-18, 40 S.E.2d 273, 280-81
(1946) (evidence of blood at scene of crime can prove that defendant caused the victim's
death).
In Epperly, the proof of premeditation included evidence that the victim was last seen
with the defendant, that the defendant never directly denied the killing, and that the defen-
dant questioned a friend about the legal consequences of a killing if the victim's body was
missing. 224 VRR at 190-92, - S.E.2d at _ . Police found bloodstains matching the vic-
tim's bloodtype in the house where the victim and the defendant were last seen. Id at 193,
S.E.2d at - A dog tracked the defendant's scent from the victim's abandoned car
and bloodstained clothes to the home of the defendant. Id. at 197-98, - S.E.2d at
148 Id. at 202, - S.E.2d at
14 Id. at 203, - S.E.2d at __ (jury justified in finding that Epperly decided to kill
victim to silence a potential witness against him for sexual assault).
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the defendant and the victim, concealment of the victim's body, the defen-
dant's lack of remorse, and the defendant's possible motive. "8 The court
stated that first degree murder is an intentional killing committed after a
defendant had time to think."' The court failed, however, to consider
whether Epperly actually planned the killing before committing the
act.
1 50
Virginia courts should distinguish between premeditation and intent
to kill because legislative intent requires the distinction.151 William
Penn's introduction of premeditation into the criminal law reflects socie-
ty's belief that a killer acting according to a preconceived plan is more
dangerous, more culpable, and less capable of reformation than an im-
pulsive killer."2 The Pennsylvania legislature intended that courts give
"premeditation" a literal interpretation because the legislature placed
the words "premeditated" and "deliberate" in conjunction with the
clause describing the planning activities of poisoning and lying in wait.151
Virginia accepted Pennsylvania's literal interpretation of "pre-
meditation."154 Virginia courts, therefore, should give literal meaning to
the words "premeditation" and "deliberation" in the homicide statutes.
Virginia courts should also distinguish between premeditation and in-
tent to kill because premeditation is a prerequisite for capital murder and
the death penalty in Virginia.1 Before 1972, courts could impose the
death penalty for murder only upon a finding of premeditation by the
killer.158 The role of premeditation changed in 1972, however, because the
United States Supreme Court held Georgia's death penalty unconstitu-
"' Id. at 203, - S.E.2d at - (factual evidence determines existence of premedita-
tion). Previous Virginia courts usually considered whether the defendant planned the killing
and not specific factors to determine premeditation. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 1064, 1074, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1980) (piemeditation requires that defendant had time to
think about a killing and intended to kill); Mosby v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 688, 694, 190
S.E. 152, 154 (1937) (will and purpose to kill determines degree of murder); McDaniel v. Com-
monwealth, 77 Va. 281, 287 (1883) (premeditation is thinking about whether to kill and acting
according to plan about killing). But see Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700, 261
S.E.2d 550, 553 (1980) (defendant's lack of remorse shows premeditation by defendant).
U 224 VRR at 203, - S.E.2d at -.
' Id at 203-04, - S.E.2d at
's' See Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 703-04, 261 S.E.2d 550, 555 (1980) (Poff, J.,
dissenting) (Virginia legislature intended that planning is the distinguishing factor between
first and second degree murder).
.5 Id at 703-04, 261 S.E.2d at 555 (planning is evidence of a willful persistence in
criminal action). See supra note 31 (discussion of William Penn's homicide laws).
' See Keedy, supra note 11, at 771-72 (Penn and Pennsylvania legislators intended
that premeditation be given literal meaning); Bradford, supra note 31, at 37 (Penn inten-
tionally avoided phrase "malice aforethought" and used premeditated murder to describe
Pennsylvania's only capital offense).
5 See supra note 34 (Virginia enacted a version of Pennsylvania's homicide laws).
' See supra text accompanying note 9 (explanation and discussion of requirement of
premeditation for capital murder).
" See supra note 10 (premeditation is factor distinguishing between capital murder
and second degree murder).
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tional in Furman v. Georgia."' In Furman, separate trial courts convicted
two defendants of rape and one defendant of murder.1" The trial courts
sentenced all the defendants to death.'59 The defendants appealed,
challenging the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Con-
stitution.16 Although the Furman court held Georgia's capital punish-
ment statutes unconstitutional, the majority did not hold the death penal-
ty unconstitutional in all cases. 6 ' The Furman decision placed premedita-
tion into the position of determining lengths of sentences instead of life
and death.' After Furman, the Georgia legislature amended the capital
punishment statutes to comply with the constitutional requirements set
by the United States Supreme Court in Furman.6 '
Premeditation returned to the crucial position of separating life and
death with the United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v.
Georgia.'64 In Gregg, the Court considered whether the death penalty was
a per se violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments."5 The Court
held that the death penalty was constitutional.'66 The Court found that
157 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
' Id. at 240.
159 Id.
10 Id. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The fourteenth amendment applies the
eighth amendment to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see also Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (amendments to Constitution applicable to states through
fourteenth amendment). The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" first appeared in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 to forbid severe, arbitrary, and discriminatory penalties
unauthorized by statutes or beyond the jurisdiction of a court. See Granucci, Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 845-46 (1969).
Early courts recognized torture and "barbarious" methods of execution as "cruel and
unusual punishment" prohibited by the eighth amendment. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 447 (1890) (punishment involving torture is cruel). At the same time, many states
adopted the death penalty for the crime of murder. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176
(1976) (death penalty accepted in United States and England); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 316-28 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussion of history of death penalty).
1.1 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976). In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether the death penalty under Georgia laws was per
se unconstitutional. 408 U.S. at 240. Two Justices in Furman accepted the argument that
society's standards of decency prohibit the death penalty. Id. at 370-71, 305-06 (Marshall,
Brennan, J., concurring). Three other Justices in Furman classified Georgia's procedures for
enacting capital punishment as unconstitutional. Id. at 305, 308-09, 256-57 (Stewart, White,
Douglas, J., concurring). Therefore, the Furman majority did not invalidate per se the death
penalty. 428 U.S. at 179.
" 408 U.S. at 239-40 (Furman invalidated Georgia's death penalty).
" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1976). Amended Georgia statutes retain
the death penalty for murder, kidnapping for ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed
robbery, rape, treason, and aircraft hyjacking. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1, 16-5-40, 16-5-44,
16-6-1, 16-8-41, 16-11-1 (1982).
" 428 U.S. 153 (1976).




Georgia's recently modified capital punishment statutes fulfilled con-
stitutional requirements. 7 The Gregg Court stated that the modified
laws prevented a Georgia trial court from sentencing a murderer to
death without following statutory guidelines.'68
The Virginia legislature enacted a version of Georgia's capital
punishment scheme.'69 Under Virginia's new statute, Virginia courts can
sentence a murderer convicted of a capital offense to death. 7 ° Virginia
law requires a finding of premeditation before allowing courts to impose
a death sentence. 7' Premeditation separates a short prison term from
death in the electric chair. 2 Virginia courts should, therefore, give
premeditation the meaning intended by the legislature.
Virginia Supreme Court decisions are unclear on whether Virginia
law requires a planning element for premeditation. 3 Baker, Giarratano,
Whitley, and the Smith dissent show efforts to distinguish between pre-
meditation and intent to kill. 4 The recent decision in Epperly, however,
returned to the reasoning of earlier Virginia courts equating intentional
murder with premeditated murder. 5 Virginia courts should apply the
planning requirement for premeditation. A planning requirement is con-
sistent with legislative intent.'76 Virginia should follow the legislature's in-
tent to separate premeditation and intent to kill because premeditation is
a prerequisite for capital murder and the death penalty. Virginia courts,
therefore, should put the planning back into premeditation.
M. PATRICIA WALTHER
Id. at 197 (Georgia jury can no longer impose the death penalty without following
statutory guidelines).
I Id. (jury must find aggravating circumstances listed in the statute before
recommending the death sentence).
... See VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (1982) (definition of capital murder); see supra note 1 (descrip-
tion of degrees of murder).
'I See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 258-59, 257 S.E.2d 797, 808 (1979) (death
penalty not excessive or disproportionate if follows statewide standard), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1103 (1980); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 284, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979)
(death penalty affirmed for conviction of commission of multiple murders during armed rob-
bery), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
" See VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (1982) (willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing required
for conviction of capital murder).
'" See supra notes 1 & 10 (discussion of difference in elements and punishment for
degrees of murder).
'" See infra text accompanying notes 174 & 175 (contrasting meanings of premedita-
tion adopted by different courts).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 94, 118, 123, 133 (Virginia cases distinguishing
between premeditation and intent to kill).
' See supra text accompanying note 149 (discussion of holding of Epperly court).
... See Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 703-04, 261 S.E.2d 550, 555 (1980) (Poff, J.,
dissenting) (Virginia legislature intended that planning is a factor distinguishing between
first and second degree murder). See supra text accompanying notes 116-122 (discussion of
the Smith dissent).
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